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Is There a Relationship Between  
Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development? 
 
Simon Deakin, Prabirjit Sarkar, and Mathias Siems* 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper uses recently created datasets measuring legal change over time in a sample of 
28 developed and emerging economies to test whether the strengthening of shareholder 
rights in the course of the mid-1990s and 2000s promoted stock market development in 
those countries. It finds only weak and equivocal evidence of a positive effect of share-
holder protection on market capitalisation, the value of stock trading, and the turnover 
ratio, and a negative impact on the number of listed companies. There is stronger evidence 
of reverse causality, in the sense of stock market development at country level generating 
changes in shareholder protection law. We conclude, firstly, that legal reforms were at 
least in part an endogenous response to stock market development and not simply a reac-
tion to the generation of global standards; but, secondly, that the laws passed in response 
to the demand for shareholder empowerment did not consistently have the expected im-
pact on financial markets, and may have had some negative and perverse results. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance, shareholder protection, financial development, stock 
market development. 
  
JEL Classifications: G33, G34, K22, O16 
 
1. Introduction 
 
At the core of the new institutional economics pioneered by Douglass North is the claim 
that the quality of legal and other institutions makes a difference to economic develop-
ment and growth (North, 1990; North et al., 2009).  In their cross-sectional studies of the 
relation between law and finance, Andrei Shleifer and his collaborators found evidence 
to support this claim, by demonstrating that a higher level of shareholder and creditor 
protection was correlated with increased financial development (La Porta et al. 1998, 
2008; Djankov et al., 2008). This position has been extremely influential among research-
ers and policy-makers since the mid-1990s, thanks in part to its conjunction with a parallel 
literature claiming to show that financial development promotes economic growth (King 
and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Beck et al 2000, 2003; Claessens and Laeven, 2003). 
                                                 
* Respectively, Director and Visiting Fellow, Centre for Business Research, University of Cam-
bridge (emails: s.deakin@cbr.cam.ac.uk and prabirjit@gmail.com), and Professor of Law, School 
of Law, Durham University (email: mathias.siems@durham.ac.uk). We gratefully acknowledge 
funding from the ESRC’s Rising Powers and Interdependent Futures Research Programme, Pro-
ject ‘Law, Development and Finance in Rising Powers’, Grant No. ES/J012491/1.  We also thank 
the participants of the JLFA Conference in Chicago, the Goethe/Penn Conference on Law and 
Finance in Frankfurt, the Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics 
in Bologna, and the WINIR Symposium on Property Rights in Bristol, and in particular John 
Armour, Dominic Chai, Clifford Holderness and Holger Spamann, as well as two anonymous 
referees, for helpful comments. The remaining errors are entirely our responsibility.  A version of 
this paper is forthcoming in the Journal of Law, Finance and Accounting. 
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During this time, strengthening shareholder and creditor rights as a precondition for fi-
nancial market development became a mainstay of global policy initiatives, including the 
World Bank’s Doing Business initiative, which dates from 2003 (World Bank, 2003), and 
the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance, first published in 1999 and updated in 
1999 and 2015 (OECD, 2015), as well as many national law reform programmes.  
 
However, further empirical research has cast doubt on the claim that law matters for fi-
nance.  Colonial duration, open trade and political factors such as a competitive party 
system and governmental stability have been identified as alternative factors driving in-
stitutional and economic divergence across countries and over time, resulting in uneven 
financial development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Rajan and Zingales, 
2003; Olsson, 2009; Roe and Siegel, 2011).  In addition, it is increasingly recognised that, 
as law influences economic outcomes in multiple ways and with various feedback mech-
anisms, claims about the effect of legal rules are difficult to substantiate (Chong and Cal-
deron, 2000).  The experience of the UK and the US appears to show that causality worked 
in reverse, in the sense that it was the rise of an investor class and the expansion of equity 
markets in the course of the nineteenth century which led to a strengthening of legal back-
ing for shareholder rights (Cheffins, 2001; Coffee, 2001). There is compelling evidence 
that, in the UK case, ownership dispersion preceded the enactment of shareholder-protec-
tive company legislation (Franks et al., 2009; Cheffins, 2008).  Thus in this area, at least, 
North’s hypothesis of the importance of legal-constitutional property rights for Britain’s 
industrial growth is quite hard to square with the historical evidence showing that finan-
cial development preceded legal change. 
 
In this study we update the story on the law-finance relation to the present day.  Our focus 
is on the effects of the increase in legal protection for shareholder rights which has taken 
place around the world since the 1990s.  We use newly available data on laws relating to 
shareholder protection to assess the impact on legal change on stock market development 
in 28 countries.  We also use time-series economic techniques to investigate the existence 
of a reverse-causal relationship; in other words, the possibility that, as in nineteenth cen-
tury Britain, it was changes in finance which drove legal reform.  
 
The empirical legal origins literature beginning with La Porta et al. (1998) used mostly 
cross-sectional evidence on the state of the law as it stood in the late 1990s and the early 
2000s. This was arguably not a strong empirical base from which to draw firm conclu-
sions on the long-run relationship between legal change and financial development. Our 
approach, by contrast, is based on longitudinal measures of cross-national legal variation 
for a number of countries over a long time-span, 1990-2013. These data make it possible 
to assess the relationship between legal and economic variables using time-series and 
panel-data techniques.  Thus our study breaks new grounds in two ways: firstly, in using 
novel “leximetric” techniques to measure legal change over time; and secondly in com-
bining leximetric data with econometric analysis which models the relationship between 
law and the economy in a dynamic fashion. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the legal dataset we are using and 
explains the trends it demonstrates in shareholder protection over time. Section 3 explains 
the financial data and econometric methods and it presents our econometric findings on 
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the relationship between legal reforms and economic outcomes in the area of stock market 
development. Section 4 interprets these findings and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Trends in shareholder protection over time: leximetric data and methodology 
 
2.1 Approach to legal data coding 
 
The legal data we rely on for our analysis is derived from a coding method which has 
come to be known as “leximetric” (Lele and Siems, 2007).  This involves the construction 
of a synthetic or composite index from legal materials of various kinds, principally stat-
utes, judicial decisions, and regulatory codes.  While there is a growing literature applying 
leximetric coding techniques to corporate law following the initial, pioneering work of 
La Porta et al. (1998, 2008), an exploratory method such as this should not be taken at 
face value.  In this section we set out the approach we adopted to code shareholder pro-
tection and seek to address potential criticisms of it. 
 
Evidence for the content of laws governing shareholder protection is available in the form 
of statutory and other texts, which can be retrieved over extended periods of time, making 
it possible to build a longitudinal or historical picture of changes in the strength of weak-
ness of the law over time.  This is only one form of evidence of legal regulation, and it 
could be said that as it tells us nothing of the effect of the law beyond the text, it is of 
limited significance for empirical analysis.  An alternative approach might be to conduct 
surveys of law firms and businesses, enabling data on the perceived effects of the law to 
be captured. This is what the World Bank has been doing since 2003.  Its Doing Business 
reports use survey data for some of their categories, for example on the duration of trials 
and on entry procedures for start-up firms (World Bank, 2003 and subsequent years); 
other categories in the Doing Business indices use leximetric tools in the sense that we 
are describing.  However, this still gives a comparatively short time series, and one which 
does not cover the period in the decade or so following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
when institutions in post-Socialist countries, as well as emerging markets more generally, 
were undergoing rapid change.   
 
One of the drawbacks of using surveys is that it is difficult to use them to construct his-
torical data, as few if any survey respondents will be in a position to give an informed 
and reliable response to questions about the state of the law many years in the past.  Thus 
we cannot straightforwardly conduct surveys today which provide good evidence on the 
operation of legal institutions in the 1990s.  An alternative approach, which we use here, 
is to focus on de jure measures of legal regulation, for which abundant historical evidence 
exists.  While using de jure measures opens up the problem of the gap between “law in 
the books” and “law in action”, this can be addressed by other means, namely in the 
choice of econometric models used to test for presence of causal relations between legal 
and economic variables  (on which, see section 3 below). 
 
If we focus on legal texts, we soon find that the laws and regulations relating to share-
holder protection are, in any given country, a complex amalgam of different normative 
sources; combining them into a measure or series of measures is not straightforward.  It 
is generally agreed that the approach to building an index of this kind should respect the 
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conditions for what is termed “construct validity” (OECD, 2008; Strauss and Smith, 2009; 
Black et al., 2017).   
 
The guiding assumption here is that the index is a construct or proxy for a feature of social 
(or, here, to be more precise, socio-legal) reality which cannot be directly observed.  A 
first step is to clarify what is being measured, the concept. In our case it is “shareholder 
protection”, that is, the extent to which laws and regulation protect the interests or rights 
of shareholders in their relations and dealings with directors, managers and controlling 
shareholders. The next step is to express this variable in quantitative terms. In order to 
ensure regularity in the translation of texts into a numerical form, individual indicators 
should be defined by reference to a coding algorithm or protocol which can be applied in 
a consistent way across the laws of different national systems.  Then, once initial scores 
for the indicators have been arrived at, the aggregation of values to form a single score 
or series of scores should be done in a way which allows for a coherent weighting of the 
individual variables. 
 
Clearly, there are judgments to be made at each stage of this process.  The Handbook on 
Constructing Composite Indicators jointly published as a methodological guide by the 
OECD and European Commission is clear that “composite indicators are much like math-
ematical or computational models”, and that ‘as such, their construction owes more to the 
craftsmanship of the modeller than to universally accepted scientific rules for encoding’ 
(OECD, 2008: 14). The issue is not whether a particular index is a completely accurate 
representation of an underlying reality; by definition, in the context we are considering, 
this is an unrealisable goal.  The issue, rather, is whether the process by which an index 
was constructed is sufficiently convincing to be accepted by peers, and much of this turns, 
we suggest, on how transparent it is: in other words, how far the theoretical foundations 
and coding methodology underlying the index are clearly and convincingly described, 
and to what extent the data themselves and the sources underlying them are accessible to 
other researchers. 
 
The index we are using, the CBR Extended Shareholder Protection Index (Siems, 2008a 
and 2016), contains ten indicators or variables, which are set out, with their relevant cod-
ing algorithms, in Table 1.  The indicators were not chosen at random.  According to the 
OECD/European Commission Handbook, indicators should reflect a ‘theoretical frame-
work’ which provides a “basis for the selection and combination of single indicators into 
a meaningful composite indicator under a fitness-for-purpose principle”; the individual 
variables should be “selected on the basis of their analytical soundness, measurability, 
country coverage, relevance to the phenomenon being measured and relationship to each 
other” (OECD, 2008: 15).   
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Table 1. Variables on Shareholder Protection: Definition and Coding Algorithm 
  
 
Definition Algorithm 
1. Powers of the 
general meeting 
for de facto 
changes 
If the sale of more than 50 % of the company’s assets requires approval of the 
general meeting it equals 1; if the sale of more than 80 % of the assets requires 
approval it equals 0.5; otherwise 0. 
2. Agenda setting 
power 
 
Equals 1 if shareholders who hold 1 % or less of the capital can put an item on 
the agenda; equals 0.75 if there is a hurdle of more than 1 % but not more than 
3%; equals 0.5 if there is a hurdle of more than 3 % but not more than 5%; 
equals 0.25 if there is a hurdle of more than 5% but not more than 10 %; equals 
0 otherwise. 
3. Anticipation of 
shareholder deci-
sion facilitated 
Equals 1 if (1) postal voting is possible or (2) proxy solicitation with two-way 
voting proxy form has to be provided by the company (i.e. the directors or 
managers); equals 0.5 if (1) postal voting is possible if provided in the articles 
or allowed by the directors, or (2) the company has to provide a two-way proxy 
form but not proxy solicitation; equals 0 otherwise. 
4. Prohibition of 
multiple voting 
rights (super vot-
ing rights) 
Equals 1 if there is a prohibition of multiple voting rights; equals 2/3 if only 
companies which already have multiple voting rights can keep them; equals 
1/3 if state approval is necessary; equals 0 otherwise.  
5. Independent 
board members 
Equals 1 if at least half of the board members must be independent; equals 0.5 
if 25 % of them must be independent; equals 0 otherwise 
6. Feasibility of di-
rector’s dismissal 
Equals 0 if good reason is required for the dismissal of directors; equals 0.25 
if directors can always be dismissed but are always compensated for dismissal 
without good reason; equals 0.5 if directors are not always compensated for 
dismissal without good reason but they could have concluded a non-fixed-term 
contract with the company; equals 0.75 if in cases of dismissal without good 
reason directors are only compensated if compensation is specifically contrac-
tually agreed; equals 1 if there are no special requirements for dismissal and 
no compensation has to be paid. 
Note: If there is a statutory limit on the amount of compensation, this can lead 
to a higher score. 
7. Private enforce-
ment of directors 
duties (derivative 
suit) 
Equals 0 if this is typically excluded (e.g., because of strict subsidiarity re-
quirement, hurdle which is at least 20 %); equals 0.5 if there are some re-
strictions (e.g., certain percentage of share capital; demand requirement); 
equals 1 if private enforcement of directors duties is readily possible. 
8. Shareholder ac-
tion against resolu-
tions of the general 
meeting 
Equals 1 if every shareholder can file a claim against a resolution by the gen-
eral meeting; equals 0.5 if there is a threshold of 10 % voting rights; equals 0 
if this kind of shareholder action does not exist. 
9. Mandatory bid Equals 1 if there is a mandatory public bid for the entirety of shares in case of 
purchase of 30% or 1/3 of the shares; equals 0.5 if the mandatory bid is trig-
gered at a higher percentage (such as 40 or 50 %); further, it equals 0.5 if there 
is a mandatory bid but the bidder is only required to buy part of the shares; 
equals 0 if there is no mandatory bid at all. 
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10. Disclosure of 
major share own-
ership 
Equals 1 if shareholders who acquire at least 3 % of the company’s capital 
have to disclose it; equals 0.75 if this concerns 5 % of the capital; equals 0.5 
if this concerns 10 %; equals 0.25 if this concerns 25 %; equals 0 otherwise 
 
Source: CBR Leximetric Datasets, Shareholder Protection Index (Siems, 2016; initially devel-
oped in Siems, 2008a). 
 
 
 
The ten indicators represent our best assessment of the core legal and regulatory elements 
of shareholder protection regimes across developed and developing countries in the clos-
ing years of the last century and the first decades of the present one (for further detail, see 
Siems, 2008a; Armour et al., 2009a; Buchanan et al., 2014; Katelouzou and Siems, 2015; 
Siems, 2016). The relevance and usefulness of CBR dataset have been acknowledged in 
the World Bank’s Doing Business Report (World Bank 2015: 106-8), which has incorpo-
rated some of the variables from the CBR index into its own “Protecting Minority Share-
holders” index, and there is a growing body of work applying the CBR dataset and related 
data sources in econometric analysis (Armour et al., 2009a; Van der Elst, 2010; Deakin 
et al., 2012; Belloc, 2013; Guillén and Capron, 2016).   
 
The indicators include some variables which capture elements of shareholder protection 
laws of long standing but continuing significance (such as rules governing the conduct of 
general meeting, proportional voting, and derivative suits) and some which refer to areas 
of law and regulation which were relatively new or were increasing in importance for 
most countries across the period in question (such as rules on board structure and takeover 
bids).  Many of them are contained in transnational standards which influenced country-
level legal reforms in this period, in particular the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance (Samanta, 2016; Siems and Alvarez-Malcotela, 2017). 
 
The coding algorithm for each variable was intended to capture the differing degrees of 
protection provided by the law in question, using a common scale according to which a 
high value, closer to 1, indicated a greater degree of protection, and a lower value, closer 
to 0, a lesser degree of protection.  Some of the algorithms express cardinal values, while 
others express ordinal ones.  The approach taken was to use cardinal values where they 
were available, as this reduced the element of subjectivity in the coding.  Not all of the 
rules and regulations which we considered to be of interest could be expressed in cardinal 
terms. Where this was the case, an ordinal scale was constructed, which was in each case 
more or less detailed, according to the complexity of the law or regulation in question, 
and the resulting range of possible states of the law across countries.  
  
The aggregation of individual variables into a single composite measure is perhaps the 
most controversial and contested aspect of an index such as the one we are considering.  
In our view, there is no overriding objection to the combination of cardinal and ordinal 
values into a single composite score, nor to the mixing of indicators with different degrees 
of incremental variation, as long as each individual indicator is thought to be an accurate 
(or the best possible) measure of the particular aspect of legal reality which it is meant to 
be capturing.  The use of an aggregate measure, rather than individual values, is in line 
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with research in corporate governance that expresses a preference for composites or ‘”un-
dles” of variables in order to capture substitutes and complements across individual var-
iables (Schnyder, 2012b; Aguilera et al., 2012).  A further, practical consideration in fa-
vour of using aggregate scores is that the extent of variation across time in respect of the 
composite indicator is greater than that for any individual variable (see section 2.2).  This 
informs the use of the aggregate measure in our regression analysis (section 3). 
 
Nonetheless, an intractable issue with any composite index is that of weighting.  If no 
weights at all are applied, there is, in effect, an implicitly equal weighting of each indica-
tor.  This may be unrealistic, as it is plausible to believe that certain variables will be more 
important than others for certain countries, or that the relative importance of variables 
will change over time.  However, equal weighting may be a good default, in the absence 
of any systematic means of weighting different variables with regard to their assumed 
importance across countries and over time. Put slightly differently, in the absence of data 
which would enable weighting to be done in a coherent way, the default position of equal 
weighting may be the best available option. 
 
An alternative approach is to develop a separate index for each country. Black et al. 
(2017) do this for their index of firm-level corporate governance practices in four emerg-
ing markets (Brazil, India, Korea and Turkey).  Their approach makes sense in a context 
where there is enough evidence to suggest, prior to the stage of econometric testing, that 
the meaning of “good” governance differs across the countries in the sample.  In the case 
of the dataset we are using, with a much larger sample of countries (nearing 30), the task 
of differentiating the index on a country-by-country basis would be more resource-inten-
sive and would run the risk of introducing a further, undue element of subjectivity into 
the construction of the index. 
 
It may be possible, instead, to arrive at a weighting scheme through principal component 
analysis. This technique identifies clusters or groups of variables which capture variances 
in the dataset as a whole, and may thereby make it possible to get clearer results when 
regressing the scores in the index against an outcome variable (OECD, 2008: 89-91; 
Fagernäs et al., 2008).  In favour of PCA, the technique enables the data to speak for 
themselves, rather than on the basis of an a priori, subjective assignment of weights, of 
the kind which is unavoidable even with the default option of equal weighting. Against 
PCA, this type of analysis can produce groupings of variables which are statistical arte-
facts rather than expressions of any true underlying complementarities.  For this reason, 
PCA does not always produce results which are clearer than those obtained from group-
ings of variables which reflect the theory which informed the construction of the dataset 
in the first place (as the analysis conducted by Black et al., 2017 demonstrates; see also 
Fagernäs et al., 2008).   
 
The variables contained in the CBR index have been consciously chosen for their salience 
in contemporary corporate governance reforms and because, from the point of view of 
corporate governance theory, there are likely to be complementarities between different 
forms of shareholder protection (Siems, 2008a).  As such, there is a good argument for 
combining them into a single, composite score, which, in the absence of any compelling 
case to the contrary, can be expressed on the default basis of equal weighting of each 
variable. 
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2.2 Leximetric results and interpretation 
 
For the analysis presented in this paper we used the CBR shareholder protection index to 
code for the laws of thirty countries over the period between 1990 and 2013. The countries 
represented are a range of developed systems (Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA), developing 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, Tur-
key), and transition systems (China, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Russia, Slovenia). The dataset we constructed is publicly available and downloadable 
from the University of Cambridge’s data repository (Siems, 2016). 
 
The period between 1990 and 2013 was chosen in order to identify a period of time in 
respect of which all systems were undergoing a general move to liberalise their econo-
mies, as part of which legal reforms aimed at improving corporate governance rules were 
on the agenda. This period is also of interest as it includes events such as the transition to 
a market economy and the accession to the EU in some countries, as well the ‘dotcom 
bubble’ and the global financial crisis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Shareholder Protection in 30 countries, 1990 and 2013. Source: Katelouzou 
and Siems (2015). 
 
 
A comparison between 1990 and 2013 in Figure 1 shows that, without exception, all 
countries have increased the level of shareholder protection. The trend is especially clear 
for certain emerging markets, such as China and Russia.  This result is in line with quan-
titative findings using similar indices. The corresponding 60-variable CBR dataset has 
been coded for longer time-frames (usually 1970-2005), although for a more limited num-
ber of countries: France, Germany, India, the UK and the US (Lele and Siems 2007, Ar-
mour et al., 2009b), Australia (Anderson et al., 2012a, 2012b), Malaysia (Chen, 2013), 
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Belgium and Italy (Van der Elst, 2010).1  Other studies reach corresponding findings with 
alternative datasets measuring aspects of shareholder protection and corporate law (Pis-
tor, 2000; Hyytinen et al., 2003; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011; Masouros, 2013; Sa-
manta, 2016). Research mapping the global spread of corporate governance codes under 
the influence of transnational standard-setting bodies including the World Bank and 
OECD (Aguilera et al., 2013) also points to a similar picture, and is relevant here since 
the CBR indices not only code the positive law but also take into account alternative 
forms of regulation, such as corporate governance codes as well as listing rules and case 
law (see Lele and Siems, 2007; Siems, 2008a; Siems, 2016). 
 
Figure 2 presents the same data by reference to changes over time in the scores for each 
individual indicator, averaged across all countries. This chart shows that the variables 
which showed the most rapid and continuous rate of increase were those relating to the 
presence of independent directors on boards and the mandatory bid rule in takeover bids 
(variables 5 and 9 respectively).  The adoption of shareholder-protective rules in these 
two areas of corporate governance is a sign of the growing influence of a norm of ‘share-
holder primacy’ associated with Anglo-American corporate law and practice (Hansmann 
and Kraakman, 2001). 
 
The trend towards shareholder-protective corporate governance reforms around the world 
is also confirmed in more detailed country-specific research that aims to explain these 
trends. For example, Schnyder (2011, 2012a) presents an in-depth discussion of how 
ownership structures have influenced corporate governance reforms in the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Switzerland, and Klages (2013) discusses the evolution of corporate govern-
ance reforms in Germany.  
 
A modified position is that of Gilson (2001) who suggests that functional convergence is 
likelier than formal convergence: while the underlying problems are similar, there are too 
many obstacles in the way of formal harmonisation – where “functional” means that a 
comparable result is produced, with, say, incompetent directors being removed, but along 
different statutory paths. However, such line of reasoning can also be challenged by tak-
ing the historical comparative perspective. It can be shown that many rules, such as those 
on independent directors, audit committees and derivative actions, have been popular le-
gal transplants in recent decades (Siems, 2008b: 134, 195, 222). Such formal convergence 
also explains the trend of Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
1  Guillén and Capron (2016) use the 10-variable CBR index to generate a dataset of over 70 
countries, and arrive at a similar result to ours on trends in shareholder protection. Although their 
dataset is based on the coding algorithm developed in the CBR research, their findings cannot be 
verified, as the underlying legal data used to generate their codings have not been published.  For 
methodological discussion of the processes for validating findings from synthetic legal indexes, 
including the importance of publishing the raw data and coding algorithms underlying leximetric 
research, see Spamann, 2015, and Verkerke and Freyens, 2017. 
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Figure 2: Shareholder Protection in 30 Countries, 1990-2013, Scores for Individual 
Variables (see Table 1). Source: Katelouzou and Siems (2015). 
 
 
In terms of the direction of convergence, our data, as we have seen, offer some support 
for the claim of Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) that the Anglo-American model of cor-
porate law, with shareholder primacy as the main guiding principle, has become increas-
ingly influential, at least at the level of the formal law.  Relatedly, Cioffi (2010) and 
Barker (2010) highlight the prevalence of shareholder-orientated law reforms under both 
left-wing and right-wing governments. Thus, the argument is that – in contrast to previous 
work by Roe (1997) – protecting shareholders has also become an issue of concern for 
the social democratic left, for example, with the aims of appealing to new voting blocks, 
to enable better monitoring of companies following financial scandals, and possibly also 
to accommodate changes to pension systems which in many countries “turn workers into 
capitalists” (Gelter, 2014; McGaughey, 2016; Roe and Coan, 2017). 
 
A number of other forces may have led to this convergence. Adopting an interdisciplinary 
perspective on legal change, Siems (2008b) finds that the increased use of modern forms 
of communication, approximations in economic policy, company and shareholder struc-
tures, and the liberalisation of capital markets all account for growing legal similarities 
across national systems. Dignam and Galanis (2009) pursue a similar line of research and 
conclude that it was mainly the process of economic globalisation, led by capital and 
product market liberalisation, that led to changes in national-level corporate governance 
regimes in this period. But this does not imply that these reforms may, then, not also have 
an effect on financial development at country level. The following empirical analysis aims 
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to address this question of a possible reciprocal relationship between shareholder protec-
tion and stock market development. 
 
3.  The financial impact of legal and regulatory changes: econometric analysis 
 
3.1 Financial and legal data: a first look 
 
As just explained, the legal dataset we are using covers 30 countries over the period 1990 
to 2013.  Long-term stock market data are not fully available for all years and countries. 
Thus, in order to have a balanced panel, we choose a time span of 1996-2012 for 28 
countries (the two countries omitted on the grounds of unavailability of data are Estonia 
and Lithuania). 
 
As indicators of stock market development we use the following four variables, drawn 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017):  
 
 market capitalisation of listed companies as a % of GDP, MKAPY.  Market cap-
italization is the share price times the number of shares outstanding;  
 
 stocks traded as a % of GDP, VSTKY.  This variable refers to the total value of 
shares traded during the period. It complements the market capitalization ratio by 
showing whether market size is matched by trading;   
 
 turnover ratio: the total value of shares traded during the one year period divided 
by the average market capitalization for the period, TURNOVER;  
 
 listed domestic companies per million of population, LISTPOPM. Listed domes-
tic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's 
stock exchanges at the end of the year. This indicator does not include investment 
companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles. 
 
Figure 3 presents the trends in each of these financial variables over time alongside the 
changes in the scores for the shareholder protection index over the same period.  On the 
face of it, any link between them is likely to be tenuous, as the shareholder protection 
scores show a steady rise while the values for the financial indicators indicate a high 
degree of fluctuation over time, with large falls after the collapse of the dotcom bubble in 
the early 2000s and again in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008.  However, 
this does not rule out the possibility of a secular trend linking the legal and financial 
variables over the period as a whole once the short-term effects of the dotcom bubble and 
the financial crisis are netted out.   
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Figure 3. Trends in stock market development and shareholder protection, 28 countries, 
1996-2013. Sources: World Development Indicators (stock market capitalisation) and 
Siems et al. 2016 in CBR Leximetric Datasets (shareholder protection), all scaled from 0 
to 1 based on the lowest and highest values. 
 
 
Revealingly, Figure 4, which plots changes in market capitalisation against the rate and 
direction of change in the shareholder protection index, suggests that there may indeed 
be some plausibility in the idea of a law-finance link, as the two trends are now more 
closely matched, although also with strongly divergent trends in the early 2000s (with 
stock market capitalisation in decline but shareholder protection increasing). The 
corresponding figures (Figures 5 and 6) for the rate of change in shareholder protection 
and stocks traded as percentage of GDP, as well as for the turnover ratio, are very similar. 
The closest correlation of trends, displayed in Figure 7, seems to concern the evolution 
of the number of listed firms and the rate of change in shareholder protection. However, 
in each case a simple comparison of the time trends does not clearly suggest that one 
preceded the other in a consistent way across the period, thus making it difficult to discern 
any clear basis for imputing a causal relationship between them. 
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Figure 4. Trends in stock market capitalisation and change in shareholder protection, 
28 countries, 1996-2013. Sources: see Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Trends in the value of stock traded and change in shareholder protection, 28 
countries, 1996-2013. Sources: see Figure 3. 
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Figure 6. Trends in the turnover ratio and change in shareholder protection, 28 coun-
tries, 1996-2013. Sources: see Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Trends in number of listed companies per million of population and change in 
shareholder protection, 28 countries, 1996-2013. Sources: see Figure 3. 
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3.2 Examining the law-finance relation in closer detail: Granger causality tests 
 
To examine more systematically whether stock market development caused, or was 
caused by, changes in law, we use panel VAR (Vector-Autoregressive) and VEC (Vector 
Error Correction) Granger causality tests (on which, see Granger, 1969; Engle and 
Granger, 1987).  In this approach, if the addition of lagged values of an independent 
variable to a regression alters its relationship with an outcome variable, it is conventional 
to talk of causality flowing from one to the other.  Strictly speaking the Granger causality 
test identifies precedence rather than causation but it can be taken as a sign that causal 
relations may be present and it may thereby help to indicate the direction of a causal 
relationship. 
 
We fit a regression where X (alternative  stock market variables taken one at a time) is a 
function of its own past values and of past values of the control variable Y (real GDP 
growth rate ) and Z (the shareholder protection index): 
 
  Xit = α + ∑ λjXi,t−j
p  
j=1
+  ∑ ψkYi,t−k
p 
k=1
+  ∑ πlZi,t−l  
p
l=1
+  ԑit                                              (1) 
 
This provides a test of whether a change in the shareholder protection index “Granger 
causes” a change in the stock market variable. To see if the converse applies, we can 
reconstitute the regression with shareholder protection as the outcome variable and the 
stock market as the causal one. 
 
We use as a control variable the real growth rate of GDP (GGDP). This can be expected 
to net out the country-specific effects of time-trend and cyclical fluctuations on stock 
market variables. In earlier research using the CBR dataset (Sarkar, 2013; Deakin et al., 
2014), the log of real GDP was used as a control; for international comparability, values 
were converted into a common measure using purchasing power parity exchange rates. 
Using this approach, currency exchange market complications and the arbitrariness in-
volved in finding a common basket of commodities may, however, obscure the true pic-
ture of country-wise time-trends and cyclical fluctuations. Furthermore, for some coun-
tries these PPP-GDP data are not available. For these reasons, GGDP is a better control 
variable for our current sample. The data on GDP growth are also sourced from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
 
In fitting the above equation, we need to test whether the coefficients of the lags of Z are 
jointly significant (that is, different from zero) using the Wald-test statistic (having a chi-
square distribution). The null hypothesis is that π1=π2 =…. =πp = 0. If the Wald test 
statistic (distributed as a chi-square) calculated on the basis of this null hypothesis is very 
high (higher than the relevant critical value of the chi-square distribution), we can say 
that Z causes X (rejecting the null hypothesis of no causality), as the past values of Z 
influence the current value of X.  
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Instead of fitting the equations in level terms we can fit the equation in first-difference 
terms (∆X, ∆Y and ∆Z) and their various lags.  Replicating the VAR test in terms of first-
difference we can get a VEC causality test. 
 
For the choice of lag (that is, how many past years are to be included in the causality test), 
we use a number of criteria including the sequential modified LR test statistic (LRM), the 
final prediction error (FPE), the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Schwarz infor-
mation criterion (SC), and the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). Different crite-
ria tend to suggest different lag lengths. We have taken the maximum of the alternative 
lag lengths chosen by these criteria as the order of the VAR causality tests. Subtracting 
one from the order of the VAR test we get the order of the VEC test. 
 
We can see from Table 2A that the Granger causality tests disclose no statistically signif-
icant impact of changes in shareholder protection laws on stock market development in-
dicators.  However, Table 2B reports a significant causal influence of the volume of 
shares traded and the turnover ratio on the SPI.  This implies that while there might be 
causal relations running in both directions between legal and financial variables, the 
stronger influence is that running from the economy to the legal system. 
 
 
3.3 Distinguishing between short-term and long-term relationships: dynamic panel 
data analysis 
 
Granger causality tests aim to clarify the predominant direction of causality between two 
variables, but do not provide much other information on the nature of the relationship 
between them.  A complementary approach which allows for a richer analysis of interac-
tions between variables over time is the dynamic panel data analysis proposed by Pesaran 
et al (1999).  In particular, this makes it possible for us to take a closer look at what may 
be going on in cases where legal change triggers a financial response of some kind. 
 
Conventional panel data analysis of the law-finance relation (for example, La Porta et al., 
1998; Guillén and Capron, 2016) in effect treats the relationship between legal change 
and economic outcomes as instantaneous, which is an unrealistic basis for analysis. By 
contrast, the models proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999) make it possible to model the im-
pact of legal change in a more dynamic way which captures lags and feedback effects.  In 
particular this approach makes it possible to model the impact of a regulatory change in 
terms of an initial short-term relationship, followed by an adjustment path which gener-
ates a long run relationship.  This captures in a formal way the intuition that legal change 
will often generate an effect after a lag or delay of some kind, as well as the possibility 
that short-run and long-run outcomes may differ in both direction and magnitude, as firms 
adjust to and absorb the impact of a regulatory “shock” (for further discussion of these 
effects, see Deakin et al., 2014).   
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Table 2. Causal Relationships between Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development 
Indicators for the Panel of 28 Countries, 1996-2012: Panel VAR and VEC Granger Causality 
Tests 
 
Table 2A: Influence of Shareholder Protection on Stock Market Development 
 
(i) Panel VAR Causality Tests 
 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent 
variable 
Test statistic: 
Chi-square 
Lag chosen Probability 
SPI MKAPY 0.697993 3 0.8737 
SPI VSTKY 1.088249 3 0.7799 
SPI TURNOVER 5.931291 4 0.2043 
SPI LISTPOPM 2.358729 3 0.5014 
 
(ii) Panel VEC Causality Tests 
 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable Test statistic: 
Chi-square 
Lag chosen Probability 
SPI MKAPY 0.117426 2 0.9430 
SPI VSTKY 0.514655 2 0.7731 
SPI TURNOVER 5.642451 3 0.1304 
SPI LISTPOPM 1.635842 2 0.4413 
 
 
 
Table 2B: Influence of Stock Market Development on Shareholder Protection 
 
(i) Panel VAR Causality Tests 
 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable Test statistic: 
Chi-square 
Lag chosen Probability 
MKAPY SPI 3.432790 3 0.3296 
VSTKY SPI 7.935319** 3 0.0474 
TURNOVER SPI 11.77230** 4 0.0191 
LISTPOPM SPI  1.097397 3 0.7777 
 
(ii) Panel VEC Causality Tests 
 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable Test statistic: 
Chi-square 
Lag chosen Probability 
MKAPY SPI 2.519774 2 0.2837 
VSTKY SPI 9.751199*** 2 0.0076 
TURNOVER SPI 10.68342** 3 0.0136 
LISTPOPM SPI  1.635842 2  0.4413 
 
Notes: 
 
The null hypothesis of no causality is rejected at the 5 % level (**) and 1% level (***). 
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Sources: MKAPY (stock market capitalisation as a % of GDP), VSTKY (value of stock trading 
as a % of GDP), TURNOVER (turnover ratio, or ratio of stock trading over stock market capital-
isation) and LISTPOPM (listed companies per million of population) are derived from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators.  SPI (shareholder protection index) is derived from the 
CBR Leximetric Datasets (Siems, 2016).  
 
 
 
 
Pesaran et al. (1999) suggest three alternative models which make different assumptions 
about the way in which unobservable cross-national differences mediate the reception of 
a common event affecting a group of countries. At one extreme there is the dynamic fixed 
effect model (DFE).  Here, intercepts vary across the countries, but all other parameters 
and error variances are constrained to be the same.  One way of thinking about this model, 
in the context we are considering, is that it assumes that a legal change impacts on finan-
cial variables in the same way across different countries, country-level heterogeneities 
notwithstanding. 
 
At the other extreme, in the mean group (MG) model, separate equations for each country 
are estimated and used to calculate the mean of the estimates.  In this approach the under-
lying assumption is that the legal change impacts on finance in a different way in each 
country. 
 
The intermediate alternative is the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator, which allows 
intercepts, short-run coefficients and error variances to differ freely across the countries, 
while constraining the long run coefficients to be the same (in other words, i =  andi 
 for all i while i may differ from group to group).  The PMG model is the most inter-
esting and intuitively appealing of the three because it tests the claim that while the initial 
effects of a global regulatory “shock” are likely to differ from one system to the next, 
thanks to country-level heterogeneities, over time there may be a degree of convergence 
as economies respond in a similar way to a changed institutional environment. 
 
Each model presupposes a long-term relationship of some kind among the variables. Thus 
a first step is to carry out tests of panel cointegration. These indicate that there are indeed 
long-term relationships (Table 3). 
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Table 3: Tests of Cointegration among the stock market development indicators, real GDP 
growth rate and Shareholder Protection Index: Selected Number of Cointegrating Relations by 
Model 
 
Table 3A: Stock Market Development Indicator: MKAP 
      
      
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 3 3 3 2 3 
Max-Eigen-
value 3 3 3 2 3 
      
      
 
 
     
 
Table 3B: Stock Market Development Indicator: VSTKY 
      
      
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 3 3 3 3 3 
Max-Eigen-
value 3 3 3 3 3 
      
      
 
Table 3C: Stock Market Development Indicator: TURNOVER 
 
      
      
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 3 3 3 3 3 
 Max-Eigen-
value 3 3 3 3 3 
      
      
 
Table 3D: Stock Market Development Indicator: LISTPOPM 
      
      
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 2 2 2 2 2 
Max-Eigen-
value 2 2 2 2 2 
      
 
 
Sources: see Table 2 
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We next consider the nature of the long-run relationships in question.  Where X indicates 
stock market development, Y is the real growth rate of GDP, and Z is the shareholder 
protection index, SPI, we have the following initial relationship between the variables, 
where i (=1,2,3..) represents countries, t (=1,2,… ) represents periods (years),iand i 
are the long-run parameters, and it  is the error term. 
 
  Xit= i Yit + i Zit   + it                                                       (2)  
 
Following Pesaran et al. (1999), we then use the following error correction representation: 
 
∆Xit = θi (ηit−1  ) + ∑ λij∆Xi,t−j
p−1  
j=1
+ ∑ ψ
ik
∆Yi,t−k
q−1  
k=0
+ ∑ πil∆Zi,t−l  
r−1  
l=0
+ μ
i 
+ ϕit                                         (3) 
 
where Δ is the difference operator, i is the country-specific error-correcting speed of 
adjustment term, ij,ik  and il are the coefficients of the lagged variables,  is the coun-
try fixed effect  and it is the disturbances term. The existence of a meaningful long-run 
relationship with a stable adjustment dynamics requires i < 0.   
 
We use the STATA model developed by Blackburne and Frank (2007) to estimate the 
three alternative models developed by Pesaran et al. (MG, PMG and DFE). The lag struc-
ture (p, q, r) is determined with the help of the Lag Exclusion Wald Test for each variable 
separately (within the maximum lags chosen in the relevant panel VEC causality tests).  
A series of Hausman tests (MG vs. PMG, DFE vs. MG and DFE vs. PMG) are then carried 
out to identify the most appropriate model in each case.  
 
Table 4 reports the results of our dynamic panel data analysis. They show no significant 
positive impact of shareholder protection law on stock market development for two out 
of the three models (the DFE and MG models). In the case of the PMG model, on the 
other hand, they show a significant, positive long-term impact of shareholder protection 
on three of the stock market variables (market capitalisation, value of shares traded, and 
turnover ratio), and a negative one in the case of the fourth (number of listed companies). 
This negative impact of SPI on listed firms is also observed in the DFE model.  
 
The Hausman test suggests that the PMG model is the most reliable one only in the case 
of the finding that shareholder protection impacts negatively on the number of listed com-
panies.  In the case of market capitalisation, the Hausman test is unable to identify an 
appropriate model.  In the case of shares traded and the turnover ratio, the DFE model is 
chosen; this indicates a negative, although non-significant, impact of shareholder protec-
tion on stock market development. 
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Table 4: Short-run and Long-run Impact of Shareholder Protection Index on Stock Market 
Development Indicators, 1996-2012: Dynamic Panel Models 
 
Table 4A. Dependent variable: stock market capitalisation (MKAPY) 
 
Independent and 
control variables 
PMG 
Model 
MG 
Model 
DFE 
Model 
Long-term 
Relationship 
   
GGDP  11.227*** 12.326*** 3.07*** 
SPI 1.841*** 7.374 -1.907 
Short-term 
relationship 
   
 -.981*** -1.799*** -.655*** 
ΔMKAPYt-1 -.136 .241 -.009 
ΔMKAPYt-2 -.116 .156 -.04 
ΔGGDPt -5.45*** -12.137*** -.87 
ΔGGDPt-1 -4.762*** -9.165*** -1.412*** 
ΔGGDPt-2 -.854 -3.888 -.182 
ΔSPIt 3.452 7.304 2.792 
ΔSPIt-2 11.807 5.256 -.899 
 41.119 24.159 48.602*** 
Chosen Model    
 
Table 4B. Dependent variable: value of stock market trading (VSTKY) 
 
Independent and 
control variables 
PMG 
Model 
MG 
Model 
DFE 
Model 
Long-term 
relationship 
 6.866 8.545*** 
 
  
GGDP  1.453*** 6.866 8.545*** 
SPI 2.485*** 7.016 -.318 
Short-term 
relationship 
   
 -.302*** -.684*** -.45*** 
ΔGGDPt 3.333* -8.715** -1.792** 
ΔGGDPt-1 1.949** -4.479** -1.169* 
ΔGGDPt-2 1.364 -3.11* -.828 
ΔSPIt 14.537 .541 2.319 
ΔSPIt-2 -8.239 -10.769 -1.261 
 17.182** 124.034* 17.292 
Chosen Model   DFE 
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Table 4C. Dependent variable: turnover ratio (TURNOVER) 
 
Independent and 
control variables 
PMG 
Model 
MG 
Model 
DFE 
Model 
Long-term 
relationship 
 6.866 8.545*** 
 
  
GGDP  4.188*** 38.836 5.229 
SPI 9.872*** 106.097 -9.145 
Short-term 
Relationship 
   
 -.477*** -.751*** -.352*** 
ΔTURNOVERt-1 .283 .992 .021 
ΔTURNOVERt-2 -.272 -.272 .189** 
ΔGGDPt 1.323 6.521 -.147 
ΔGGDPt-1 -6.291 1.13 -.635 
ΔGGDPt-2 .461 -1.958 -.824 
ΔGGDPt-3 1.838 5.296 -.46 
ΔSPIt -9.988 37.747* 5.129 
ΔSPIt-2 17.657 24.274* 7.322 
      4.298 229.352* 41.223** 
Chosen Model   DFE 
 
 
Table 4D. Dependent variable: listed companies (LISTPOPM) 
 
Independent and 
control variables 
PMG 
Model 
MG 
Model 
DFE 
Model 
Long-term 
Relationship 
   
GGDP  .33*** .852 .673 
SPI -1.14*** -3.068 -3.102** 
Short-term 
Relationship 
   
 -.253*** -.444*** -.299*** 
ΔGGDPt .048 .013 -.109 
ΔGGDPt-1 -.198 -.231 -.107 
ΔGGDPt-2 -.072 -.139 -.058 
ΔSPIt -.1999 .401 -.143 
      8.343*** 19.445*** 11.863*** 
Chosen Model PMG   
 
 
Notes 
 
Significances are reported at the 10% level (*), 5 % level (**) and 1% level (***). 
 
The most appropriate model is chosen on the basis of a series of Hausman tests. In Table 4A the 
Hausman test could not identify a most appropriate model.  
 
Sources: see Table 2. 
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These results therefore disclose some evidence of a positive effect of shareholder rights 
on stock market capitalisation, value of shares traded and the turnover ratio. The results 
would have been clearer if the Hausman test had identified the PMG model as the most 
statistically appropriate one in each case, but all the same they point to the possibility that 
legal reforms are having a common, convergent impact across countries over time.  The 
PMG result is clearest in the case of the negative impact of shareholder protection on the 
number of listed firms.  This result can be interpreted as evidence of managers de-listing 
firms in response to laws and regulations empowering shareholders (see Armour et al., 
2009a).  It can also be read as implying that increases in shareholder rights have a non-
linear relationship with corporate governance outcomes; beyond a certain point, empow-
ering shareholders no longer generates gains in terms of reduced agency costs, but adds 
to the costs of regulatory compliance and inhibits effective management (Deakin et al., 
2012; Katelouzou and Siems, 2015).   
 
4. Interpretation 
 
Our results have implications for the understanding of the process by which global trends 
in corporate governance regulations are translated into financial outcomes at country 
level.  We can see, firstly, that the adoption of national laws empowering shareholders 
was not simply a response to the emergence, in the 1990s and 2000s, of a new global 
standard.  On the contrary, our Granger causality results suggest that demand for such 
laws was, at least in part, endogenous to financial development at country level.   
 
Granger causality tests are an indication of the historical precedence of one variable over 
another; in our study, they show that increases in the value of stock trading and in the 
turnover ratio preceded the legal strengthening of shareholder rights.  This is consistent 
with the view that changes in corporate law are a response to prior developments in the 
scale and structure of financial markets, which country-specific research on the history of 
stock market development has previously argued to be the case (Cheffins, 2001; Coffee, 
2001; Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2009).   
 
It is not clear from our analysis which particular mechanisms might be driving adjust-
ments in the law. The historical research just cited points to the rise of an investor class 
in the course of the nineteenth century as one factor (among others) strengthening legal 
backing for shareholder rights. It has also been argued that more recent law reforms in 
the US and India, for example, favouring the interests of shareholders and other investors, 
can be related to the influence of lobbying (Armour and Lele, 2009; Rock, 2013). How-
ever, other research has explored the possibility that lobbying does not necessarily lead 
to legal change, since law making may often be insulated from private participation. This 
line of work suggests that there is much variation between countries on the relevance of 
lobbying (Milhaupt and Pistor, 2008: 176; Cioffi and Höpner, 2006). 
 
It is also possible that countries adopt pro-shareholder corporate laws as part of a wider 
strategy of seeking foreign direct investment, and that they are more likely to do so when 
subject to structural adjustment reforms of the kind initiated by the IMF.  In addition, the 
presence of particular types of investment fund in a country, such as sovereign wealth 
funds or hedge funds, may serve as to put pressures on governments to initiate pro-share-
holder legal reforms.  We do not have systematic data for all countries and years within 
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the range of our current study to be able to identify these effects, but collating data of this 
kind with a view to carrying out such an analysis would be an appropriate focus for future 
research. 
 
While taking into account the likely influence of economic and financial changes on the 
legal system, we should not neglect the possibility that corporate law changes can, in turn, 
trigger or stimulate financial development.  Our Granger causality analysis does not rule 
out the possibility of law influencing finance, even if it does suggest that the effects of 
the economy on the legal system may be stronger.   
 
Focusing on the possibility that law does affect finance, our dynamic panel data analysis 
provides some (weak) evidence of a positive impact of shareholder protection on stock 
market values and trading, and some (stronger) evidence of negative effect on the number 
of listed companies.  It would seem then that there has been a connection between legal 
and regulatory reforms, on the one hand, and stock market development, on the other, 
over the period of our study, but that the relationship is complex and not altogether con-
sistent in its effects upon financial indicators.   
 
We see that increased shareholder protection may, over time, have the effect of increasing 
share values as measured by stock market capitalisation, and of deepening stock market 
activity as measured by the volume of shares traded and the turnover ratio.  This is evi-
dence in favour of the view that shareholder protection encourages investor participation 
in equity markets by reducing managerial agency costs.  If so, shareholder protection 
should lead to a reduction in the cost of capital, although we cannot infer that result di-
rectly from our study.  We should also recognise that many factors may affect stock mar-
ket liquidity, including herding and similar effects associated with “bubbles”, and that our 
analysis does not make it possible to disaggregate the effects of the law alongside other 
factors.  The link we find between shareholder protection and the volume of shares traded, 
on the one hand, and the turnover ratio, on the other, may be a better measure of the 
tangible influence of legal changes on the scale and depth of stock market activity.  With 
additional data we might be in a better position to see if a legal change initiates an increase 
in IPOs and rights issues.  This is a matter for future research. 
 
The existence of a negative relationship between shareholder protection and the number 
of listed companies might seem at odds with some of the other results.  It could indicate 
that increased legal protections for shareholders induce excessive compliance costs for 
companies, deterring listings and artificially increasing the cost of equity capital for firms.  
On the other hand, the introduction of more stringent corporate governance requirements 
for listed firms could be seen as encouraging smaller and less efficient firms to de-list.  A 
further possibility is that smaller and less efficient firms are more vulnerable to takeover 
(and hence to de-listing) in a context where larger and more efficient ones can more easily 
access finance.  Country-level studies of the kind carried out by Franks et al. (2009) for 
the UK could be a way to analyse in a more fine-grained way the possibly conflicting or 
mutually-offsetting effects of shareholder protection on patterns of listing and de-listing. 
 
The inherent limitations of our analysis should be acknowledged.  We have presented 
results from a panel data analysis in which many country-level effects cannot be directly 
observed.  The panel data models we have used make different assumptions about the 
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nature of unobserved cross-country heterogeneity. Making assumptions of this kind is 
unavoidable in a panel-data analysis which has the merit of identifying trends across a 
range of countries.  The alternative approach would be to study individual national sys-
tems more closely in order to reveal more of the country-specific effects which we cannot 
observe in the panel data study.  Single country studies or paired comparisons may not be 
able to produce generalisable findings in the same way that panel studies can, but they 
may be able to throw more light on the institutional and other factors which mediate the 
effects of legal and regulatory change at country level.  Ideally, panel data approaches 
and more detailed country studies should be used in conjunction with each other (Bu-
chanan et al., 2014).  The present paper suggests that more work can be done on studying 
country-specific effects of the kind which might be driving our finding of the equivocal 
and possibly even counter-productive impact of laws and policies aimed at empowering 
shareholders. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have presented new evidence on the relationship between changes to 
laws and regulations affecting corporate governance, on the one hand, and changes in the 
structure and scale of financial markets, on the other.  Our leximetric evidence on the 
extent of legal changes affecting shareholder rights shows a high degree of convergence 
across developed and developing countries in the 1990s and 2000s, with middle income 
countries, in particular Russia and China, taking the lead in adopting pro-shareholder re-
forms.  Our econometric evidence suggests that while this trend was global in nature, it 
was not simply a response to the generation of new international standards during the 
period of the study.  On the contrary, analysis using Granger causality techniques suggests 
that financial development, in the form of increasing stock market values and a higher 
value of stock trading, preceded legal changes.   
 
However, our dynamic panel data analysis suggests that evidence for the converse effect 
– namely, the positive impact of legal changes on financial development – is weak and 
equivocal.  We used the pooled mean group regression model to estimate whether a short-
term regulatory “shock” generates a stable adjustment path to a long-term relationship of 
some kind. Using this approach, we find some evidence of a positive long-term effect of 
increases in shareholder protection on stock market capitalisation, the value of shares 
traded, and the turnover ratio. However, Hausman tests do not consistently identify the 
pooled mean group regression as the most appropriate model when compared to models 
incorporating different assumptions on the likely nature of any consistent or generalisable 
cross-national effect, some of which point to a negative impact of shareholder protection 
on stock market values and trading volumes.  For this reason, the positive results we get 
from the pooled mean group regression must be regarded as provisional until better evi-
dence becomes available.  Where we do get an unequivocal result, it shows that a tight-
ening of shareholder protection led to a reduction in the number of listed companies, 
which suggests that managers, when faced with stricter controls, responded by taking 
companies private. 
 
The belief that corporate law reform would lead to financial development in emerging 
markets has been a core part of the policy of the international financial institutions since 
the mid-1990s.  It is becoming clear, however, that this belief is only partially borne out 
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by the evidence.  The emerging picture is, on the one hand, that of the endogenous devel-
opment of corporate law in response to trends in financial markets, but, on the other, of a 
transmission mechanism linking legal reform to economic outcomes which is incomplete 
at best.   
 
Our results do not in themselves cast doubt on the importance of North’s insights on the 
relevance of property rights for economic growth, but they do suggest that it may be mis-
leading to think of the relationship between legal change and financial development as a 
straightforwardly linear one.  Legal reforms are likely to be stimulated by endogenous 
demand for property rights protection, rather than operating as a wholly exogenous force, 
shaping economic outcomes.  Thus, in principle, a coevolutionary framework for under-
standing the law-finance relation, which allows for reciprocal causation and dynamic in-
teractions between the legal and financial systems (Aoki, 2007, 2010; Buchanan et al., 
2014), would seem to be called for.  At the same time, as we have seen here, the weight 
of evidence is that there is a strong influence running from finance to law, so that any 
such reciprocity is asymmetric. This cautions against the view that legal reforms will 
generally translate in a straightforward way into improved financial outcomes.  
 
This “asymmetric’ understanding of the law-finance relation has implications for the de-
sign of transnational corporate governance standards, such as those promoted by the 
World Bank and the OECD.  Where changes to the laws of a given country are triggered 
by external factors such as the influence of international standard-setting bodies, the pres-
ence of endogenous demand, coupled with complementary institutions at country-level, 
will make a difference to the effectiveness of the law in practice and hence to financial 
outcomes.   
 
It is likely that we are seeing, in our panel data analysis, only a weak and partial impact 
of law on financial development, because of the diversity of country-specific factors 
which mitigate or counteract the influence of legal reforms.  Thus our results suggest that 
more work needs to be done on understanding the institutional conditions needed for legal 
reforms to be translated into financial development at country level.  They point up the 
need for empirical analyses which are sensitive to country-level effects which are not 
easily observable in large panels.  In addition they may serve as a cautionary message to 
policy makers on the limits of what can be achieved through transnational harmonisation 
initiatives. 
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